A STRATEGY TO STOP MASS ATROCITIES: THE U.S. MILITARY’S SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN SAVING LIVES THROUGH INTERVENTION

This analysis evaluates potential strategies for military operations to halt mass atrocities, also known as Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO). Examining the strategy and outcomes of six U.S. humanitarian interventions in Iraq, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, the analysis evaluates whether operations were more successful when they sought to provide short-term humanitarian aid or when they focused on resolving long-term issues of governance and political security of the victim group. The analysis concludes that missions focusing on short-term needs were universally successful and that policy makers frequently underestimated the resources and effort required to resolve long-term issues of political security, leading to strategic failures. Military planners and policy makers are advised to constrain military goals to minimize opposition from the perpetrator group when the aim is to save the most lives with a minimal commitment of national will and resources