Topics
HarvardAgent
electronic commerceCompany
(Article begins on next page) The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters. Citation Parkes, David C. 2000. Optimal auction design for agents with hard valuation problems. In Agent mediated electronic commerce II: Towards next-generation agent-based electronic commerc
AbstractThis paper addresses several basic problems inspired by the adaptation of economic mechanism...
A key feature of online markets for advertising (e.g., sponsored links) is that clicking rates depen...
Current auctions often expose bidding agents to two difficult, yet common, problems. First, bidding ...
As traditional commerce moves on-line more business transactions will be mediated by software agents...
Consider a seller with multiple digital goods or services for sale, such as movies, soft-ware, or ne...
Auctions are probably the most important mechanism for dynamic pricing in electronic commerce. Altho...
Auctions on the Internet can involve not only consumers, but also businesses. They can form dynamica...
We study a fundamental problem in micro economics called optimal auction design: A seller wishes to ...
We survey digital auction research area. In particular, we provide up to date state of the art in th...
Standard auction mechanisms often break down in important e-commerce applications, where agents dema...
Bayesian auction design investigates how to sell scarce resources to agents with private values draw...
Combinatorial auctions provide an important tool for mechanism design in multi-agent systems. When i...
This thesis is about the design and analysis of smart markets for selling commodities and resources....
This paper addresses several basic problems inspired by the adaptation of economic mechanisms, and a...
(Article begins on next page) The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please s...
AbstractThis paper addresses several basic problems inspired by the adaptation of economic mechanism...
A key feature of online markets for advertising (e.g., sponsored links) is that clicking rates depen...
Current auctions often expose bidding agents to two difficult, yet common, problems. First, bidding ...
As traditional commerce moves on-line more business transactions will be mediated by software agents...
Consider a seller with multiple digital goods or services for sale, such as movies, soft-ware, or ne...
Auctions are probably the most important mechanism for dynamic pricing in electronic commerce. Altho...
Auctions on the Internet can involve not only consumers, but also businesses. They can form dynamica...
We study a fundamental problem in micro economics called optimal auction design: A seller wishes to ...
We survey digital auction research area. In particular, we provide up to date state of the art in th...
Standard auction mechanisms often break down in important e-commerce applications, where agents dema...
Bayesian auction design investigates how to sell scarce resources to agents with private values draw...
Combinatorial auctions provide an important tool for mechanism design in multi-agent systems. When i...
This thesis is about the design and analysis of smart markets for selling commodities and resources....
This paper addresses several basic problems inspired by the adaptation of economic mechanisms, and a...
(Article begins on next page) The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please s...
AbstractThis paper addresses several basic problems inspired by the adaptation of economic mechanism...
A key feature of online markets for advertising (e.g., sponsored links) is that clicking rates depen...
Current auctions often expose bidding agents to two difficult, yet common, problems. First, bidding ...
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