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The rationality paradox centers on the observation that people are highly intelligent, yet show evidence of errors and biases in their thinking when measured against normative standards. Elqayam and Evans ’ (2011) reject normative standards in the psychological study of thinking, reasoning and deciding in favor of a ‘value-free ’ descriptive approach to studying high-level cognition. In reviewing Elqayam and Evans ’ (2011) position, we defend an alternative to descriptivism in the form of ‘soft normativism, ’ which allows for normative evaluations alongside the pursuit of descriptive research goals.We propose that normative theories have considerable value provided that researchers: (1) are alert to the philosophical quagmire of strong relativism; (2) are mindful of the biases that can arise from utilizing normative benchmarks; and (3) engage in a focused analysis of the processing approach adopted by individual reasoners. We address the controversial ‘is–ought ’ inference in this context and appeal to a ‘bridging solution ’ to this contested inference that is based on the concept of ‘informal reflective equilibrium. ’ Furthermore, we draw on Elqayam and Evans ’ (2011) recognition of a role for normative benchmarks in research programs that are devised to enhance reasoning performance and we argue that such Meliorist researc