PAPERS

The Persistent Shock Mechanism for Preventive War: This paper extends a simple, complete information, preventive war model to include shifts in the distribution of power that play out over an arbitrary number of time periods. This extension leads to a sufficient condition that implies war under a broader set of conditions than previously shown in the literature. Necessary and sufficient conditions for war are shown for a specific bargaining protocol. The empirical implication follows that preventive war can be caused by relatively slow, but persistent shifts in the distribution of power. Differential rates of economic growth and the consequent acquisition of finances for potential military build-ups can potentially cause war under this mechanism. This insight serves to connect the economic shifts emphasized in power transition theory with the commitment problem explanation for preventive war analyzed in bargaining models of war. An illustrative case study of World War I highlights the empirical implications. Dynamic International Bargaining and War with Endogenously Biased Leaders (with John Slinkman): The domestic institutional structure of countries affects the likelihood of war. We model institutional divergence by comparing an infinitely lived dictatorship to