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After amputation, individuals often have vivid experiences of their absent limb (i.e., a phantom limb). Therefore, one’s con-scious image of one’s body cannot depend on peripheral input only (Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1998). However, the origin of phantom sensations is hotly debated. Reports of vivid phan-toms in the case of congenital absence of the limb show that memory of former body state is not necessary (Brugger et al., 2000). According to one view, phantoms may reflect innate organization of sensorimotor cortices (Melzack, 1990). Alter-natively, phantoms could reflect generalization from viewing other people’s bodies (Brugger et al., 2000), a sensorimotor example of the classic theory that understanding oneself fol-lows from understanding the “generalized other ” (Mead, 1934, p. 154). Because phantom limbs cannot be stimulated, sensory testing cannot directly compare visual and somatosensor