RESEARCH ARTICLE The Neural Basis of Testable and Non- Testable Beliefs

Beliefs about the state of the world are an important influence on both normal behavior and psychopathology. However, understanding of the neural basis of belief processing remains incomplete, and several aspects of belief processing have only recently been explored. Specifically, different types of beliefs may involve fundamentally different inferential pro-cesses and thus recruit distinct brain regions. Additionally, neural processing of truth and falsity may differ from processing of certainty and uncertainty. The purpose of this study was to investigate the neural underpinnings of assessment of testable and non-testable propositions in terms of truth or falsity and the level of certainty in a belief. Functional mag-netic resonance imaging (fMRI) was used to study 14 adults while they rated propositions as true or false and also rated the level of certainty in their judgments. Each proposition was classified as testable or non-testable. Testable propositions activated the DLPFC and pos-terior cingulate cortex, while non-testable statements activated areas including inferior fron-tal gyrus, superior temporal gyrus, and an anterior region of the superior frontal gyrus. No areas were more active when a proposition was accepted, while the dorsal anterior cingu