My Software has a Vulnerability, should I Worry?

Abstract—(U.S) Rule-based policies to mitigate software risk suggest to use the CVSS score to measure the individual vulner-ability risk and act accordingly: an HIGH CVSS score according to the NVD (National (U.S.) Vulnerability Database) is therefore translated into a “Yes”. A key issue is whether such rule is economically sensible, in particular if reported vulnerabilities have been actually exploited in the wild, and whether the risk score do actually match the risk of actual exploitation. We compare the NVD dataset with two additional datasets, the EDB for the white market of vulnerabilities (such as those present in Metasploit), and the EKITS for the exploits traded in the black market. We benchmark them against Symantec’s threat explorer dataset (SYM) of actual exploit in the wild. We analyze the whole spectrum of CVSS submetrics and use these characteristics to perform a case-controlled analysis of CVSS scores (similar to those used to link lung cancer and smoking) to test its reliability as a risk factor for actual exploitation. We conclude that (a) fixing just because a high CVSS score in NVD only yields negligible risk reduction, (b) the additional existence of proof of concepts exploits (e.g. in EDB) may yield some additional but not large risk reduction, (c) fixing in response to presence in black markets yields the equivalent risk reduction of wearing safety belt in cars (you might also die but still...). On the negative side, our study shows that as industry we miss a metric with high specificity (ruling out vulns for which we shouldn’t worry). [In order to address the feedback from BlackHat 2013’s audience, the final revision (V3) provides additional data in Appendix A detailing how the control variables in the study affect the results.] I