Best Response Games on Regular Graphs

With the growth of the internet it is becoming increasingly important to understand how the behaviour of players is affected by the topology of the network interconnecting them. Many models which involve net-works of interacting players have been proposed and best response games are amongst the simplest. In best response games each vertex simultane-ously updates to employ the best response to their current surroundings. We concentrate upon trying to understand the dynamics of best response games on regular graphs with many strategies. When more than two strategies are present highly complex dynamics can ensue. We focus upon trying to understand exactly how best response games on regular graphs sample from the space of possible cellular automata. To understand this issue we investigate convex divisions in high dimensional space and we prove that almost every division of k − 1 dimensional space into k con-vex regions includes a single point where all regions meet. We then find connections between the convex geometry of best response games and the theory of alternating circuits on graphs. Exploiting these unexpected con-nections allows us to gain an interesting answer to our question of when cellular automata are best response games.