Add to ORKGWe analyze the setting of minimum-cost perfect matchings with selfish vertices through the price of anarchy (PoA) and price of stability (PoS) lens. The underlying solution concept used for this analysis is the Gale-Shapley stable matching notion, where the preferences are determined so that each player (vertex) wishes to minimize the cost of her own matching edge
We introduce a new measure of the discrepancy in strategic games between the social welfare in a Nas...
Abstract. We study a geometric version of a simple non-cooperative network creation game introduced ...
In this paper, we propose a new algorithm for two-sided matching problems with some compromise. We d...
Abstract. We consider the loss in social welfare caused by individual rationality in matching scenar...
Due to the lack of coordination, it is unlikely that the selfish players of a strategic game reach a...
We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the well-known problem of one-sided matching, or hou...
We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the wellknown problem of one-sided matching, or hous...
We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the well-known problem of one-sided matching, or hou...
We consider a two-player resource allocation polytope game, in which the strategy of a player is res...
Price of Anarchy measures the welfare loss caused by selfish behavior: it is defined as the ratio of...
Price of Anarchy measures the welfare loss caused by selfish behavior: it is defined as the ratio of...
Consider the following scheduling game. A set of jobs, each controlled by a selfish agent, are to be...
We introduce a new measure of the discrepancy in strategic games between the social welfare in a Nas...
htmlabstractWe study the inefficiency of equilibria for various classes of games when players are (p...
AbstractOptimization theory resolves problems to minimize total costs when the agents are involved i...
We introduce a new measure of the discrepancy in strategic games between the social welfare in a Nas...
Abstract. We study a geometric version of a simple non-cooperative network creation game introduced ...
In this paper, we propose a new algorithm for two-sided matching problems with some compromise. We d...
Abstract. We consider the loss in social welfare caused by individual rationality in matching scenar...
Due to the lack of coordination, it is unlikely that the selfish players of a strategic game reach a...
We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the well-known problem of one-sided matching, or hou...
We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the wellknown problem of one-sided matching, or hous...
We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the well-known problem of one-sided matching, or hou...
We consider a two-player resource allocation polytope game, in which the strategy of a player is res...
Price of Anarchy measures the welfare loss caused by selfish behavior: it is defined as the ratio of...
Price of Anarchy measures the welfare loss caused by selfish behavior: it is defined as the ratio of...
Consider the following scheduling game. A set of jobs, each controlled by a selfish agent, are to be...
We introduce a new measure of the discrepancy in strategic games between the social welfare in a Nas...
htmlabstractWe study the inefficiency of equilibria for various classes of games when players are (p...
AbstractOptimization theory resolves problems to minimize total costs when the agents are involved i...
We introduce a new measure of the discrepancy in strategic games between the social welfare in a Nas...
Abstract. We study a geometric version of a simple non-cooperative network creation game introduced ...
In this paper, we propose a new algorithm for two-sided matching problems with some compromise. We d...