We investigate the hardness of establishing as many stable marriages (that is, marriages that last forever) in a population whose memory is placed in some arbitrary state with respect to the considered problem, and where traitors try to jeopardize the whole process by behaving in a harmful manner. On the negative side, we demonstrate that no solution that is completely insensitive to traitors can exist, and we propose a protocol for the problem that is optimal with respect to the traitor containment radius.
The Byzantine failure model allows arbitrary behavior of a certain fraction of network nodes in a di...
We define a new model for algorithms to reach Byzantine Agreement. It allows one to measure the comp...
The function, f(n), represents the maximum number of stable matchings possible in an instance of siz...
We investigate the hardness of establishing as many stable marriages (that is, marriages that last f...
Secure networks rely upon players to maintain security and reliability. However not every player can...
This paper investigates the problem of Byzantine Agreement in a synchronous system where malicious a...
In this paper the well-known Stable Marriage Problem is considered once again. The name of this pro...
We study strategy issues surrounding the stable marriage problem. Under the Gale-Shapley algorithm (...
AbstractThe stable marriage problem is a game theoretic model introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962)....
We study strategic issues in the Gale-Shapley stable marriage model. In the first part of the paper,...
In an instance of the stable marriage problem of size n, n men and n women each ranks members of the...
AbstractIn a seminal paper, Feldman and Micali show an n-party Byzantine agreement protocol in the p...
AbstractThe function, f(n), represents the maximum number of stable matchings possible in an instanc...
AbstractWe obtain a family of algorithms that determine stable matchings for the stable marriage pro...
Given an instance I of the classical Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete preference lists (smi),...
The Byzantine failure model allows arbitrary behavior of a certain fraction of network nodes in a di...
We define a new model for algorithms to reach Byzantine Agreement. It allows one to measure the comp...
The function, f(n), represents the maximum number of stable matchings possible in an instance of siz...
We investigate the hardness of establishing as many stable marriages (that is, marriages that last f...
Secure networks rely upon players to maintain security and reliability. However not every player can...
This paper investigates the problem of Byzantine Agreement in a synchronous system where malicious a...
In this paper the well-known Stable Marriage Problem is considered once again. The name of this pro...
We study strategy issues surrounding the stable marriage problem. Under the Gale-Shapley algorithm (...
AbstractThe stable marriage problem is a game theoretic model introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962)....
We study strategic issues in the Gale-Shapley stable marriage model. In the first part of the paper,...
In an instance of the stable marriage problem of size n, n men and n women each ranks members of the...
AbstractIn a seminal paper, Feldman and Micali show an n-party Byzantine agreement protocol in the p...
AbstractThe function, f(n), represents the maximum number of stable matchings possible in an instanc...
AbstractWe obtain a family of algorithms that determine stable matchings for the stable marriage pro...
Given an instance I of the classical Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete preference lists (smi),...
The Byzantine failure model allows arbitrary behavior of a certain fraction of network nodes in a di...
We define a new model for algorithms to reach Byzantine Agreement. It allows one to measure the comp...
The function, f(n), represents the maximum number of stable matchings possible in an instance of siz...