A surplus and welfare analysis of asymmetric regulation1

Some European regulators have decided to force competition in their na-tional markets. They have decided to go beyond the second directive and apply asymmetric regulation. Gas release programs and market shares constraints are the two asymmetric decisions imposed to incumbents. When a regulator imposes a gas release program to an incumbent, this operator is compelled to release quantities of its long term contracts to its competitor. In this paper, we will focus on gas release and its impact on welfare, consumer surplus and on the level of released quantities set by regulators. The aim of a gas release program is to give access to natural gas to com-petitors. They become actives on the market and are in competition with the incumbent. These programs are time limited. They only help competitors in expecting the development of hubs or new investments in importation infrastruc-tures. If competitors want to stay active after the program, they may find others supply sources to increase security of supply