On Deliberative Authoritarian Governance∗

(job market paper) Why would an authoritarian regime set up deliberative institutions to allow people to complain publicly if, as is often presumed, complaints fa-cilitate protests and cause social instability? We argue that deliberation is a process of hierarchical communication not only between the government and the citizens, but also among the citizens. We show that deliberation serves two functions. First, it helps the government respond to fluctuating public opinion. Second, it can also help to reshape the citizens ’ beliefs. Spe-cifically, deliberation disorganizes citizens if they find themselves split over government policies. However, if deliberation reveals that a protest can be successful, the government identifies the danger, and improves the policy to appease the opposition. When the citizens are perceived to be sufficiently ho-mogeneous, deliberation is allowed. We further investigate two deliberative mechanisms that combine a private poll with either a committed respons-iveness or a censorship strategy. To achieve the best possible payoff in both mechanisms, the government needs to constrain itself from over-manipulating citizens ’ learning, thus amplifying the disorganization effect