Memorandum on the Electoral Law of the European Union: Confederal and Federal Legitimacy and Turnout European Parliament Committee on Constitutional Affairs Hearing on Electoral Reform

The European Parliament, on one view, is a direct descendant of its confederal precursor, which was indirectly elected from among the member-state parliaments of the ESCC and the EEC. In a very different view the Parliament is the incipient first chamber of the European federal demos, an integral component of a European federation in the making. These contrasting 2 confederal and federal understandings imply very different approaches to the law(s) regulating the election of the European Parliament. 1. The Confederal Understanding In the confederal vision of Europe as a union of sovereign member-states, each member-state should pass its own electoral laws, execute its own electoral administration, and regulate the conduct of its representatives in European institutions, who should be accountable to member-state parties and citizens, and indeed function as their “mandatable ” delegates. In the strongest confederal vision, in the conduct of EU law-making and policy MEPs should have less powers and status than the ministers of member-states, and their delegated authorities (e.g., ambassadors, or functionally specialized civil servants). In most confederal visions MEPs should be indirectly elected from and accountable to their home parliaments