Rational Revolutions

Abstract This paper begins by asking if a rational choice explanation of revolution is possible. I note first and analyse critically the interesting recent literature on revolution developed mainly by sociologists with reference to the East German, Iranian and other contemporary revolutions. My own approach to this question starts by distinguishing between individual and collective rationality. In analysing revolutions (as distinct from riots, strikes, or other forms of collective action), I have argued that the second type is logically prior to the first, that is, one cannot look at the incentives facing an individual potential leader or follower of a revolutionary movement without considering first what type of state is being faced and whether it is strong or weak. The basic condition under which a rational revolution can occur is if the state has been weakened, so that the mecha-nisms which have sustained the ruler in office no longer function effectively. If the state is weak, then leadership of revolutionary movements will tend to occur spontaneously. This, in turn, tends to make individual participation in revolutionary activity rational, as dy-namic collective processes (cascades or bandwagon effects) may be set in motion by the prospect of success in overthrowing the government. I illustrate these arguments with the French Revolution. Finally, I ask if revolution could be collectively rational, not only in the sense that the current state’s ability to function is severely impaired, but in the sense that the regime which replaces it is expected to represent an improvement. I consider various criteria here – and ultimaltely suggest that one criterion may be adequate: that the revolution results in more democracy