2005 after giving birth to her son Linas. May this article help to remember her. Abstract If a strict equilibrium is suggested as the solution of a normal form game and if some but not all players are committed to their solution strategy, a reduced game results with only the still non-committed as active players. The con-sistency axiom demands that the solution of the reduced game is given by the original solution strategies of its active players. However the reduced game prop-erty asks for too much: consistent equilibrium selection in general is not possible if existence and optimality are postulated. We test in an experiment the behavioral appeal of consistency, confronting players with a solution proposal before letting them decide both ...
We focus on axiomatizations of the Pareto equilibrium concept in multicriteria games based on consis...
This article explores the relationship between uniqueness and stability in differentiable regular ga...
This paper is concerned with the realism of mechanisms that implementsocial choice functions in the ...
If a strict equilibrium is suggested as the solution of a strategic game in normal form and if some ...
If a strict equilibrium is suggested as the solution of a strategic game in normal form and if some ...
Consistency and optimality together with converse consistency provide an illuminating and novel char...
Consistency and optimality together with converse consistency provide an illuminating and novel char...
In the framework of (set-valued or single-valued) solutions for coalitional games with transferable ...
By Hart and Mas-Colell's axiomatization, it is known that the Shapley value for TU-games is fully ch...
We focus on axiomatizations of the Pareto equilibrium concept in noncoopera-tive multicriteria games...
We give a robust characterization of Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varyin...
Norde et al.[Games Econ.Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the li...
Axelord’s [(1970), Conflict of Interest, Markham Publishers, Chicago] index of conflict in 2 × 2 ...
Kohlberg and Mertens argued that a solution concept to a game should be invariant under the addition...
Concept of solutions and equilibria along with rationality of players in repeated games are re-exami...
We focus on axiomatizations of the Pareto equilibrium concept in multicriteria games based on consis...
This article explores the relationship between uniqueness and stability in differentiable regular ga...
This paper is concerned with the realism of mechanisms that implementsocial choice functions in the ...
If a strict equilibrium is suggested as the solution of a strategic game in normal form and if some ...
If a strict equilibrium is suggested as the solution of a strategic game in normal form and if some ...
Consistency and optimality together with converse consistency provide an illuminating and novel char...
Consistency and optimality together with converse consistency provide an illuminating and novel char...
In the framework of (set-valued or single-valued) solutions for coalitional games with transferable ...
By Hart and Mas-Colell's axiomatization, it is known that the Shapley value for TU-games is fully ch...
We focus on axiomatizations of the Pareto equilibrium concept in noncoopera-tive multicriteria games...
We give a robust characterization of Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varyin...
Norde et al.[Games Econ.Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the li...
Axelord’s [(1970), Conflict of Interest, Markham Publishers, Chicago] index of conflict in 2 × 2 ...
Kohlberg and Mertens argued that a solution concept to a game should be invariant under the addition...
Concept of solutions and equilibria along with rationality of players in repeated games are re-exami...
We focus on axiomatizations of the Pareto equilibrium concept in multicriteria games based on consis...
This article explores the relationship between uniqueness and stability in differentiable regular ga...
This paper is concerned with the realism of mechanisms that implementsocial choice functions in the ...