Abstract Lacking a random generator, players who intend to use their pure strategies randomly must rely on their short-term memory. Since memory capacity is seriously limited such players are prone to alternate strategies too frequently and predictability which makes them vulnerable to exploitation by other players. In our elementary evolutionary analysis of “pseudo-random ” play, we study the evolution of memory capacity, its use to predict the behavior of others and to generate own unpredictability. JEL Classification C70, D8
We present a simple game model where agents with different memory lengths compete for finite resourc...
This paper is a study of bounded memory in a reputation game. In particular, in a repeated cheap tal...
We investigate the collective behaviour of a large number of agents with one step memory horizon in ...
Abstract The human ability for random-sequence generation (RSG) is limited but improves in a competi...
In repeated games with Nash equilibria in mixed strategies, players optimize by playing randomly. Pl...
The players’ dissatisfaction in randomness due to their biases is the major problem of game’s develo...
In our daily life, we have to make our decisions with our restricted abilities (bounded rationality)...
The human ability for random-sequence generation (RSG) is limited but improves in a competitive game...
Strategies in repeated games can be classified as to whether or not they use memory and/or randomiza...
Abstract Strategies in repeated games can be classified as towhether or not they use memory and/or r...
Inspired by the behavior in repeated guessing game experiments, we study adaptive play by population...
textabstractStochastic games are a natural model for the synthesis of controllers confronted to adve...
This paper studies a model of memory. The model takes into account that memory capacity is limited a...
This paper studies a model of memory. The model takes into account that memory capacity is limited a...
hornliafa.jussieu.fr Graph games of infinite length are a natural model for open reactive processes:...
We present a simple game model where agents with different memory lengths compete for finite resourc...
This paper is a study of bounded memory in a reputation game. In particular, in a repeated cheap tal...
We investigate the collective behaviour of a large number of agents with one step memory horizon in ...
Abstract The human ability for random-sequence generation (RSG) is limited but improves in a competi...
In repeated games with Nash equilibria in mixed strategies, players optimize by playing randomly. Pl...
The players’ dissatisfaction in randomness due to their biases is the major problem of game’s develo...
In our daily life, we have to make our decisions with our restricted abilities (bounded rationality)...
The human ability for random-sequence generation (RSG) is limited but improves in a competitive game...
Strategies in repeated games can be classified as to whether or not they use memory and/or randomiza...
Abstract Strategies in repeated games can be classified as towhether or not they use memory and/or r...
Inspired by the behavior in repeated guessing game experiments, we study adaptive play by population...
textabstractStochastic games are a natural model for the synthesis of controllers confronted to adve...
This paper studies a model of memory. The model takes into account that memory capacity is limited a...
This paper studies a model of memory. The model takes into account that memory capacity is limited a...
hornliafa.jussieu.fr Graph games of infinite length are a natural model for open reactive processes:...
We present a simple game model where agents with different memory lengths compete for finite resourc...
This paper is a study of bounded memory in a reputation game. In particular, in a repeated cheap tal...
We investigate the collective behaviour of a large number of agents with one step memory horizon in ...