Add to ORKGAbstract Holler (1982) proposed the Public Good Index as a measure of the power of the players in a simple game. Bergantiños et al. (1993) dened a modication of the Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley and Shubik, 1954) for situations in which some players are incompatible. In this paper, we dene a modication of the Public Good Index for these type of situations. We illustrate this index with a real-world example taken from the political eld. Furthermore, we provide two characterizations of the new index
We introduce a new generating function based method to compute the Banzhaf, Deegan? Packel, Public ...
Some properties of the Shapley-Shubik index are presented in this chapter, along with indications as...
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems as well as electoral systems and parliamentary...
Abstract Situations in which there are incompatible players were first modeled by TU games in Bergan...
Abstract We consider four variants of the Public Good Index for games with a priori unions. The firs...
In this paper, we analyze some values and power indices from a different point of view that are well...
Tyt. z nagłówka.Bibliogr. s. 24-25.In this paper, we analyze some values and power indices from a di...
This paper discusses two variations of the Public Good Index for games with a priori unions. The fir...
Deegan and Packel (1979) and Holler (1982) proposed two power indices for simple games: the Deegan–P...
In this paper, we review and compare the main power indices to be found in the literature, that is t...
Committees with yes-no-decisions are commonly modeled as simple games and the ability of a member to...
International audienceThis work focuses on (j, 2) games in which there are several levels of approva...
This thesis considers a class of cooperative n-person games (voting games) in which the voters are s...
Power indices in simple games measure the relevance of a player through her ability in being critica...
Power indices in simple games measure the relevance of a player through her ability in being critica...
We introduce a new generating function based method to compute the Banzhaf, Deegan? Packel, Public ...
Some properties of the Shapley-Shubik index are presented in this chapter, along with indications as...
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems as well as electoral systems and parliamentary...
Abstract Situations in which there are incompatible players were first modeled by TU games in Bergan...
Abstract We consider four variants of the Public Good Index for games with a priori unions. The firs...
In this paper, we analyze some values and power indices from a different point of view that are well...
Tyt. z nagłówka.Bibliogr. s. 24-25.In this paper, we analyze some values and power indices from a di...
This paper discusses two variations of the Public Good Index for games with a priori unions. The fir...
Deegan and Packel (1979) and Holler (1982) proposed two power indices for simple games: the Deegan–P...
In this paper, we review and compare the main power indices to be found in the literature, that is t...
Committees with yes-no-decisions are commonly modeled as simple games and the ability of a member to...
International audienceThis work focuses on (j, 2) games in which there are several levels of approva...
This thesis considers a class of cooperative n-person games (voting games) in which the voters are s...
Power indices in simple games measure the relevance of a player through her ability in being critica...
Power indices in simple games measure the relevance of a player through her ability in being critica...
We introduce a new generating function based method to compute the Banzhaf, Deegan? Packel, Public ...
Some properties of the Shapley-Shubik index are presented in this chapter, along with indications as...
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems as well as electoral systems and parliamentary...
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