Competing for the Platform: The Politics of Interest Group Influence on Political Party Platforms

We use utility functions to explain the conditions under which political parties will incorporate interest group positions onto the party platform. We test the model’s implications using content analysis of 1996, 2000, and 2004 DNC party platforms and platform hearing testimony. While parties view interest groups as a means to mobilize voters, interest groups view parties and their platforms as a means to articulate interests. We demonstrate the conditions under which parties will articulate an organized interest group’s preferred positions in its quadrennial platform. Utility functions illustrate that parties will reward groups that can mobilize voters, as evidenced by a group’s resources, loyalty to the party, and ideological similarity to the party status quo. We test these implications using content analysis on three years of DNC platforms and group testimony. Results show that parties reward loyal groups that are ideologically near the party, but that resources have no effect