Provocation and the strategy of terrorist and guerilla attacks. International Organization, Forthcoming

Violent non-state groups are usually weaker than the states they target. Accordingly, theory suggests that groups carefully condition their choice of tactics on anticipated state response. Yet, we know very little about whether and how groups strategically plan attacks in anticipation of state response. We do not know if and under what conditions groups employ violent tactics to provoke or avoid a forceful state response, although extant theory is consistent with both possibilities. Relatedly, there is little systematic evidence about why groups choose terrorist or guerilla tactics and how this choice relates to anticipated state response. I develop a theoretical and empirical model of the interaction between groups and states that generates unique evidence on all three fronts. Using data on attacks in Western Europe from 1950–2004, I show that guerilla attacks are associated with provocation of forceful state response, while terrorist attacks are associated with avoiding forceful response. Furthermore, I show that groups effectively choose their tactics to avoid forceful state responses that are too damaging for themselves but provoke forceful responses that disproportionately harm civilians. These findings survive several difficult robustness and model specification tests