Strategic voting and the degree of path-dependence

This paper generalises Enelow (1981) and Lehtinen’s (2007b) model of strategic voting under amendment agendas by allowing any num-ber of alternatives and any voting order. The generalisation enables studying utilitarian efficiencies in an incomplete information model with a large number of alternatives. Furthermore, it allows for study-ing how strategic voting affects path-dependence. Strategic voting increases utilitarian efficiency also when there are more than three alternatives. The existence of a Condorcet winner does not guaran-tee path-independence if the voters engage in strategic voting under incomplete information. A criterion for evaluating path-dependence, the degree of path-dependence, is proposed, and the generalised mo-del is used to study how strategic voting affects it. When there is a Condorcet winner, strategic voting inevitably increases the degree of path-dependence, but when there is no Condorcet winner, strate-gic voting decreases path-dependence. Computer simulations show, however, that on average it increases the degree of path-dependence