Add to ORKGConsider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with pri-vate values and quasilinear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for an agent is a monotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable in dominant strategies. We fully characterize the set of all monotonicity domains
We come close to characterizing the class of social choice correspondences that are implementable in...
We characterize dominant-strategy incentive compatibility with multidimensional types. A determinist...
A fundamental problem in public finance is that of allocating a␣given budget to financing the provis...
Consider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with private values and qua...
In a social choice setting with quasilinear preferences and monetary transfers, a domain D of admiss...
In a mechanism design setting with quasilinear preferences, a domain dd of admissible valuations of ...
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves o...
In a setting where agents have quasi-linear utilities over social alternatives and a transferable co...
The Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem (J Econ Theory 14:412-418, 1977) establishes the equivalence betwee...
terministic allocation rule is implementable. We prove in this supplement the following generalizati...
We study characterizations of implementable allocation rules when types are multi-dimensional, monet...
We study characterizations of implementable allocation rules when types are multi-dimensional, monet...
This paper identifies the maximal domain of transferable utility games on which aggregate monotonici...
A social choice function may or may not satisfy a desirable property depending on its domain of defi...
We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizab...
We come close to characterizing the class of social choice correspondences that are implementable in...
We characterize dominant-strategy incentive compatibility with multidimensional types. A determinist...
A fundamental problem in public finance is that of allocating a␣given budget to financing the provis...
Consider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with private values and qua...
In a social choice setting with quasilinear preferences and monetary transfers, a domain D of admiss...
In a mechanism design setting with quasilinear preferences, a domain dd of admissible valuations of ...
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves o...
In a setting where agents have quasi-linear utilities over social alternatives and a transferable co...
The Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem (J Econ Theory 14:412-418, 1977) establishes the equivalence betwee...
terministic allocation rule is implementable. We prove in this supplement the following generalizati...
We study characterizations of implementable allocation rules when types are multi-dimensional, monet...
We study characterizations of implementable allocation rules when types are multi-dimensional, monet...
This paper identifies the maximal domain of transferable utility games on which aggregate monotonici...
A social choice function may or may not satisfy a desirable property depending on its domain of defi...
We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizab...
We come close to characterizing the class of social choice correspondences that are implementable in...
We characterize dominant-strategy incentive compatibility with multidimensional types. A determinist...
A fundamental problem in public finance is that of allocating a␣given budget to financing the provis...