Current proposals for greenhouse gas emissions regulations in the United States mainly take the form of emissions caps with tradable permits. Since Weitzman’s (1974) study of prices vs. quantities, economic theory predicts that a price instrument is superior under uncertainty in the case of stock pollutants. Given the general belief in the political infeasibility of a carbon tax, there has been recent interest in two other policy instrument designs: hybrid policies and intensity targets. We extend the Weitzman model to derive an analytical expression for the expected net benefits of a hybrid instrument under uncertainty. We compare this expression to one developed by Newell and Pizer (2006) for an intensity target, and show the theoretical ...
International audienceEnvironmental policies often set ‘‘relative'' or ‘‘intensity'' emission caps, ...
International audienceEnvironmental policies often set ‘‘relative'' or ‘‘intensity'' emission caps, ...
What is the optimal instrument design and choice for a regulator attempting to control emissions by ...
Current proposals for greenhouse gas emissions regulations in the United States mainly take the form...
Among policy instruments to control future greenhouse gases emissions, well-calibrated general inten...
For reducing greenhouse gas emissions, intensity targets are attracting interest as a flexible mecha...
This paper investigates the relative economic and environmental outcomes of price versus quantity me...
This paper investigates the relative economic and environmental outcomes of price versus quantity me...
Centre international de recherches sur l'environnement et le développement (CIRED) et Laboratoi...
This paper examines the optimal instrument choice to control emissions under uncertainty. A hybrid r...
Environmental policies often set ‘‘relative’ ’ or ‘‘intensity’ ’ emission caps, i.e. emission limits...
Abstract. We give theoretical, partial equilibrium comparisons of a tax with thresholds, tradable ta...
International audienceEnvironmental policies often set ‘‘relative'' or ‘‘intensity'' emission caps, ...
Uncertainty about compliance costs causes otherwise equivalent price and quantity controls to behave...
Uncertainty about compliance costs causes otherwise equivalent price and quantity controls to behave...
International audienceEnvironmental policies often set ‘‘relative'' or ‘‘intensity'' emission caps, ...
International audienceEnvironmental policies often set ‘‘relative'' or ‘‘intensity'' emission caps, ...
What is the optimal instrument design and choice for a regulator attempting to control emissions by ...
Current proposals for greenhouse gas emissions regulations in the United States mainly take the form...
Among policy instruments to control future greenhouse gases emissions, well-calibrated general inten...
For reducing greenhouse gas emissions, intensity targets are attracting interest as a flexible mecha...
This paper investigates the relative economic and environmental outcomes of price versus quantity me...
This paper investigates the relative economic and environmental outcomes of price versus quantity me...
Centre international de recherches sur l'environnement et le développement (CIRED) et Laboratoi...
This paper examines the optimal instrument choice to control emissions under uncertainty. A hybrid r...
Environmental policies often set ‘‘relative’ ’ or ‘‘intensity’ ’ emission caps, i.e. emission limits...
Abstract. We give theoretical, partial equilibrium comparisons of a tax with thresholds, tradable ta...
International audienceEnvironmental policies often set ‘‘relative'' or ‘‘intensity'' emission caps, ...
Uncertainty about compliance costs causes otherwise equivalent price and quantity controls to behave...
Uncertainty about compliance costs causes otherwise equivalent price and quantity controls to behave...
International audienceEnvironmental policies often set ‘‘relative'' or ‘‘intensity'' emission caps, ...
International audienceEnvironmental policies often set ‘‘relative'' or ‘‘intensity'' emission caps, ...
What is the optimal instrument design and choice for a regulator attempting to control emissions by ...