Add to ORKGWe consider a regulated market for credence goods where prices are \u85xed. Not knowing about the exact service she actually needs, the client has to rely on the advice of the expert. There are two types of experts: experts never cheating and opportunistic experts taking advantage of the information asymmetry. We compute Bayesian-Nash equilibria in pure and mixed strategies. The rejection strategy of the clients and the honest colleagues may prevent the cheating ex-perts from always recommending a high price service. We discuss price setting strategies which reduce, with minimal welfare cost, the pro\u85ts of the fraudulent experts as well as the amount of fraud. This kind of price setting is in line with a modi\u85ed notion of an incentive...
This paper considers a credence goods market in which each expert carries out a conditionally indepe...
In expert service markets, consumers must rely on experts to identify the type of service they need....
In credence goods markets, experts have better information about the appropriate quality of treatmen...
We consider a market for credence goods. There are two types of experts: persons who never cheat and...
Abstract we present a model of credence goods in which the consumers are heterogenous in terms of th...
A client has a problem, but does not know whether it is serious or minor. She consults an expert who...
In this paper we study distributed agent matching in environments characterized by uncertain signals...
This paper studies the incentives for credence goods experts to invest effort in diagnosis if effort...
This paper studies the incentives for credence goods experts to invest effort in diagnosis if effort...
We study a credence goods market in which an expert holds private information about his treatment co...
With a credence good consumers are never sure about the extent of the good they actually need. There...
This paper examines a process by which information-revealing prices are determined by considering th...
Most of us need the services of an expert when our apartment's heating or our washing machine breaks...
In this paper we revisit the first price and the second price sealed-bid auctions, but, unlike the s...
International audienceConsumers often rely on an expert's diagnosis to assess their needs. If the ex...
This paper considers a credence goods market in which each expert carries out a conditionally indepe...
In expert service markets, consumers must rely on experts to identify the type of service they need....
In credence goods markets, experts have better information about the appropriate quality of treatmen...
We consider a market for credence goods. There are two types of experts: persons who never cheat and...
Abstract we present a model of credence goods in which the consumers are heterogenous in terms of th...
A client has a problem, but does not know whether it is serious or minor. She consults an expert who...
In this paper we study distributed agent matching in environments characterized by uncertain signals...
This paper studies the incentives for credence goods experts to invest effort in diagnosis if effort...
This paper studies the incentives for credence goods experts to invest effort in diagnosis if effort...
We study a credence goods market in which an expert holds private information about his treatment co...
With a credence good consumers are never sure about the extent of the good they actually need. There...
This paper examines a process by which information-revealing prices are determined by considering th...
Most of us need the services of an expert when our apartment's heating or our washing machine breaks...
In this paper we revisit the first price and the second price sealed-bid auctions, but, unlike the s...
International audienceConsumers often rely on an expert's diagnosis to assess their needs. If the ex...
This paper considers a credence goods market in which each expert carries out a conditionally indepe...
In expert service markets, consumers must rely on experts to identify the type of service they need....
In credence goods markets, experts have better information about the appropriate quality of treatmen...