Are Ontological Debates Defective?∗

is right, but for reasons that run deeper than mere philosophical fashion. Metaphysics has been suspect at least since Hume told us to consign it to the flames, but its reputation reached a new low when the logical positivists announced it ‘eliminated ’ (Carnap 1959) once and for all. And even though metaphysics has crept back into philosophical acceptability once again, prov-ing positivist rumors of its death greatly exaggerated, lingering doubts plague its practitioners. As metaphysical inquiry has intensified, so has the skeptical itch of these doubts. No wonder, then, if we have finally reached the point where we cannot but scratch. The itch is felt deeply by those metaphysicians asking ontological questions — questions about what there is. Carnap (1950) told us these questions were defective: either trivial or unintelligible. The spirit, if not the letter, of his position has chafed a number of contemporary philosophers — defectors — into agreement.1 Many defectors find broadly linguistic fault with ontological questions