Add to ORKGAbstract. " We show that, in markets with indivisibilities (typified by the Shapley-Scarf housing market), the strict core mechanism is categorically determined by three assumptions: individ-ual rationality, Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness
We consider the n-player houseswapping game of Shapley-Scarf (1974), with indifferences in preference...
We provide an axiomatic characterization of the core of games in effectiveness form. We point out th...
It is well known that the core of an exchange market with indivisible goods is always non empty, alt...
This note considers the equilibrium outcomes of the preference revelation games in the general model...
Abstract. In a general model of indivisible good allocation, Sönmez (1999) established that, whenev...
We study markets with indivisible goods where monetary compensations are not possible. Each individu...
We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents’ preferences possibly exh...
This paper studies the incentive compatibility of solutions to gener-alized indivisible good allocat...
We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exh...
A social choice function may or may not satisfy a desirable property depending on its domain of defi...
As shown by Peleg (1993), the core of market games is characterized by nonemptiness, individual rati...
If a market is considered to be a social choice function, then the domain of admissible preferences ...
This note considers the equilibrium outcomes of the preference revelation games in the general model...
Which strategy-proof nonbossy mechanisms exist in a model with a finite number of indivisible goods ...
We consider the generalization of Shapley and Scarf’s (1974) model of trading indi-visible objects (...
We consider the n-player houseswapping game of Shapley-Scarf (1974), with indifferences in preference...
We provide an axiomatic characterization of the core of games in effectiveness form. We point out th...
It is well known that the core of an exchange market with indivisible goods is always non empty, alt...
This note considers the equilibrium outcomes of the preference revelation games in the general model...
Abstract. In a general model of indivisible good allocation, Sönmez (1999) established that, whenev...
We study markets with indivisible goods where monetary compensations are not possible. Each individu...
We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents’ preferences possibly exh...
This paper studies the incentive compatibility of solutions to gener-alized indivisible good allocat...
We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exh...
A social choice function may or may not satisfy a desirable property depending on its domain of defi...
As shown by Peleg (1993), the core of market games is characterized by nonemptiness, individual rati...
If a market is considered to be a social choice function, then the domain of admissible preferences ...
This note considers the equilibrium outcomes of the preference revelation games in the general model...
Which strategy-proof nonbossy mechanisms exist in a model with a finite number of indivisible goods ...
We consider the generalization of Shapley and Scarf’s (1974) model of trading indi-visible objects (...
We consider the n-player houseswapping game of Shapley-Scarf (1974), with indifferences in preference...
We provide an axiomatic characterization of the core of games in effectiveness form. We point out th...
It is well known that the core of an exchange market with indivisible goods is always non empty, alt...