Abstract – In listed companies, the Board of directors has ultimate responsibility for information disclosure. The conventional wisdom is that director independence is an essential factor in improving the quality of that disclosure. In a sense, this approach subordinates expertise to independence. We argue that effective certification may require firm-specific expertise, in particular for intangible-intensive business models. However, this latter form of expertise is negatively related to independence as it is commonly measured and evaluated. Accordingly, there exists an optimal share of independent directors for each company, related to the level of intangible resources
AbstractWhen there is high information asymmetry between directors and managers, independent directo...
When there is high information asymmetry between directors and managers, independent directors do no...
This study investigates the link between board independence and the quality of community disclosures...
In listed companies, the Board of directors has ultimate responsibility for information disclosure. ...
International audienceIn listed companies, the Board of directors is the ultimate responsible of inf...
In listed companies, the Board of directors has ultimate responsibility for information disclosure. ...
The empirical evidence on the association between board structure and firms’ voluntary disclosures i...
Scepticism about independence as a solution to corporate governance problems is both understandable ...
This paper reviews and draws insights from recent empirical research in financial accounting on the ...
International audienceThis paper examines the relationships between independence, director unobserva...
When capital markets are assumed to be (informationally) efficient and the firm a mere collection of...
The generally weak correlation between board independence and firm performance is a major empirical ...
This study investigates the link between board independence and the quality of community disclosures...
Regulators and shareholders are calling for independent directors. Independent directors, however, h...
Although recent research documents a positive relation between corporate transparency and the propor...
AbstractWhen there is high information asymmetry between directors and managers, independent directo...
When there is high information asymmetry between directors and managers, independent directors do no...
This study investigates the link between board independence and the quality of community disclosures...
In listed companies, the Board of directors has ultimate responsibility for information disclosure. ...
International audienceIn listed companies, the Board of directors is the ultimate responsible of inf...
In listed companies, the Board of directors has ultimate responsibility for information disclosure. ...
The empirical evidence on the association between board structure and firms’ voluntary disclosures i...
Scepticism about independence as a solution to corporate governance problems is both understandable ...
This paper reviews and draws insights from recent empirical research in financial accounting on the ...
International audienceThis paper examines the relationships between independence, director unobserva...
When capital markets are assumed to be (informationally) efficient and the firm a mere collection of...
The generally weak correlation between board independence and firm performance is a major empirical ...
This study investigates the link between board independence and the quality of community disclosures...
Regulators and shareholders are calling for independent directors. Independent directors, however, h...
Although recent research documents a positive relation between corporate transparency and the propor...
AbstractWhen there is high information asymmetry between directors and managers, independent directo...
When there is high information asymmetry between directors and managers, independent directors do no...
This study investigates the link between board independence and the quality of community disclosures...