Association For Psychological Science

Reprints and permissions: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1745691612460685 pps.sagepub.com “Evidence used to support dual theories is consistent with single-system accounts.” (Osman, 2004, p. 1006) “Dual-process theories of reasoning exemplify the backwards development from precise theories to surrogates.” (Gigerenzer, 2011, p. 739) “We propose that the different two-system theories lack conceptual clarity, that they are based upon methodological methods that are questionable, and that they rely on insufficient (and often inadequate) empirical evidence.” (Keren & Schul, 2009, p. 534) “In this article, we presented a number of convergent arguments and empirical evidence for a unified theoretical approach that explains both intuitive and deliberative judgments as rule based, as opposed to the dual-systems approach of qualitatively different processes.” (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011, p. 106) The distinction between two kinds of thinking, one fast and intuitive, the other slow and deliberative, is both ancient in origin and widespread in philosophical and psychological writing. Such a distinction has been made by many authors in many fields, often in ignorance of the related writing of others (Frankish & Evans, 2009). Our particular interest is in dual-process accounts of human reasoning and related higher cognitive processes, such as judgment and decision making. Such theories have thei