Add to ORKGAbstract. In many developing democracies local party brokers distribute mate-rial benefits to voters. Yet we find that many brokers consume a share of these goods. This raises important puzzles. Why do party bosses rely on brokers who take goods that could be used to win votes? Why do voters support parties whose brokers take their goods? We argue that brokers must be compensated for the voters they mobilize. Bosses can motivate some brokers with the promise of polit-ical careers, but these careers are scarce. Thus, bosses tolerate many brokers who steal resources for their compensation. Since a broker’s mobilizing effort gives a boss incentives to channel resources to a broker’s constituency, voters also tolerate brokers who skim some reso...
ABSTRACT: Research in many countries shows that where voters and campaign workers are motivated by m...
In many countries, clientelist parties (or political machines) distribute selective benefits, especi...
Brusco, Suraj Jacob and the conference and workshop participants. This material is based upon work s...
Machine parties have been an important focus in political science during the past decade. The Argent...
The book is about distributive politics. The received theories usually predict that parties and gov...
Why do some parties fail to benefit from patronage in pork-ridden political systems? This article an...
Why do some parties fail to benefit from patronage in pork-ridden political systems? This article an...
This article shows that the disloyalty of political brokers causes party fragility. Lacking distinct...
Parties rely on brokers to win elections in much of the developing world. How do parties use compens...
Parties rely on brokers to win elections in much of the developing world. How do parties use compens...
Parties rely on brokers to win elections in much of the developing world. How do parties use compens...
Parties rely on brokers to win elections in much of the developing world. How do parties use compens...
This article shows that the disloyalty of political brokers causes party fragility. Lacking distinct...
This article shows that the disloyalty of political brokers causes party fragility. Lacking distinct...
Political brokers mobilize voters all over the world, yet little is known about what motivates them ...
ABSTRACT: Research in many countries shows that where voters and campaign workers are motivated by m...
In many countries, clientelist parties (or political machines) distribute selective benefits, especi...
Brusco, Suraj Jacob and the conference and workshop participants. This material is based upon work s...
Machine parties have been an important focus in political science during the past decade. The Argent...
The book is about distributive politics. The received theories usually predict that parties and gov...
Why do some parties fail to benefit from patronage in pork-ridden political systems? This article an...
Why do some parties fail to benefit from patronage in pork-ridden political systems? This article an...
This article shows that the disloyalty of political brokers causes party fragility. Lacking distinct...
Parties rely on brokers to win elections in much of the developing world. How do parties use compens...
Parties rely on brokers to win elections in much of the developing world. How do parties use compens...
Parties rely on brokers to win elections in much of the developing world. How do parties use compens...
Parties rely on brokers to win elections in much of the developing world. How do parties use compens...
This article shows that the disloyalty of political brokers causes party fragility. Lacking distinct...
This article shows that the disloyalty of political brokers causes party fragility. Lacking distinct...
Political brokers mobilize voters all over the world, yet little is known about what motivates them ...
ABSTRACT: Research in many countries shows that where voters and campaign workers are motivated by m...
In many countries, clientelist parties (or political machines) distribute selective benefits, especi...
Brusco, Suraj Jacob and the conference and workshop participants. This material is based upon work s...