I find that non-binding announcements of support for a public good encourage others to contribute. Others respond with contribution even though the non-binding announcements can be — and often are — made by non-contributors. In a field experiment involving over 36,000 employees at 278 workplaces, giving employees an easy way to announce support for a charity raises an additional $525 per workplace, almost 10 % of average workplace giving. In a complementary laboratory experiment, subjects donate twice as much when they observe another subject announce support for a charity. Facilitating individuals to announce support is a powerful tool to increase public good provision. C91, C93, H4
Suggested contributions, membership categories, and discrete, incremental thank-you gifts are device...
We experimentally investigate the impact of recognizing contributors on public good contributions. W...
This paper builds an experiment to investigate whether asking people to state how much they will don...
In this paper, we study the effect of announcement and observation on voluntary public good provisio...
In this paper, we study the effect of pre-play announcements and ex-post observation of decisions on...
Commonly regarded as an important driver of donation behavior, public recognition also can reduce do...
The paper presents a simple theoretical framework to explain the influence of the possibility to mak...
Public recognition is usually thought to motivate charitable giving. However, the current research i...
International audienceIn this paper, we study the effect of pre-play announcements and ex-post obser...
Charities frequently announce contributions of donors as they accrue. Doing so induces donors to pla...
Repeated one-shot public good experiments commonly tell participants only oftheir group's total cont...
Recommended contributions are often observed in fundraising campaigns for charitable and other publi...
Charities frequently spend significant expenses on solicitation. A common findingis potential donors...
This paper builds an experiment to investigate whether asking people to state how much they will don...
We experimentally investigate the impact of recognizing contributors on public good contributions. W...
Suggested contributions, membership categories, and discrete, incremental thank-you gifts are device...
We experimentally investigate the impact of recognizing contributors on public good contributions. W...
This paper builds an experiment to investigate whether asking people to state how much they will don...
In this paper, we study the effect of announcement and observation on voluntary public good provisio...
In this paper, we study the effect of pre-play announcements and ex-post observation of decisions on...
Commonly regarded as an important driver of donation behavior, public recognition also can reduce do...
The paper presents a simple theoretical framework to explain the influence of the possibility to mak...
Public recognition is usually thought to motivate charitable giving. However, the current research i...
International audienceIn this paper, we study the effect of pre-play announcements and ex-post obser...
Charities frequently announce contributions of donors as they accrue. Doing so induces donors to pla...
Repeated one-shot public good experiments commonly tell participants only oftheir group's total cont...
Recommended contributions are often observed in fundraising campaigns for charitable and other publi...
Charities frequently spend significant expenses on solicitation. A common findingis potential donors...
This paper builds an experiment to investigate whether asking people to state how much they will don...
We experimentally investigate the impact of recognizing contributors on public good contributions. W...
Suggested contributions, membership categories, and discrete, incremental thank-you gifts are device...
We experimentally investigate the impact of recognizing contributors on public good contributions. W...
This paper builds an experiment to investigate whether asking people to state how much they will don...