PAST POSITIONS

Democratic spillovers–rent-seeking elites, mobile capital, and the coevolution of political institutions Political institutions in separate countries influence each other. This paper examines the role of capital mobility as one such channel of mutual influence. Elite groups can extract rents from their populations. However, capital can be shifted towards countries with less extractive policies. This affects the political trajectory of countries with rent-seeking elite. (1) When the ownership of capital is distributed widely in the population, capital mobility disciplines the elite, and helps capital owners buy their way into the elite. (2) Conversely if the ownership of capital is limited to the elite, they may take advantage of the efficient policies abroad while increasing rent extraction on captive assets at home. (3) A small country in a position to set up reliable institutions may become a tax haven to attract the capital held by foreign elite. In turn, these three mechanisms degrade the institutions and policies of the efficient countries. WORK IN PROGRESS Asset complementarity, resource shocks, and the political economy of property rights This papers considers the conflict over the distribution of the joint output between tw