Add to ORKGThis paper studies a model of long-term contracting for experimentation. We consider a principal-agent relationship with adverse selection on the agent’s ability, dynamic moral haz-ard, and private learning about project quality. We find that each of these elements plays an essential role in structuring dynamic incentives, and it is only their interaction that generally precludes efficiency. Our model permits an explicit characterization of optimal contracts
It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentivecompatible mechanisms on the assum...
It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assu...
It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentivecompatible mechanisms on the assum...
This paper studies long-term contracts for experimentation in a principal-agent setting with adverse...
I study optimal contracting in a model in which a principal hires an agent in order to experiment on...
We analyze a long-term contracting problem involving common uncertainty about a parameter capturing ...
In practice, incentive schemes are rarely tailored to the specific characteristics of contracting pa...
Before embarking on a project, a principal must often rely on an agent to learn about its profitabil...
We introduce uncertainty into the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) model to study optimal long-term cont...
We study a novel dynamic principal-agent setting with moral hazard and adverse selection (persistent...
We study a novel dynamic principal-agent setting with moral hazard and adverse selection (persistent...
I study a continuous time principal-agent model in which an unknown parameter and the agent's hidden...
This dissertation contains three related essays which examine contracting environments with moral ha...
It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentivecompatible mechanisms on the assum...
It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentivecompatible mechanisms on the assum...
It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentivecompatible mechanisms on the assum...
It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assu...
It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentivecompatible mechanisms on the assum...
This paper studies long-term contracts for experimentation in a principal-agent setting with adverse...
I study optimal contracting in a model in which a principal hires an agent in order to experiment on...
We analyze a long-term contracting problem involving common uncertainty about a parameter capturing ...
In practice, incentive schemes are rarely tailored to the specific characteristics of contracting pa...
Before embarking on a project, a principal must often rely on an agent to learn about its profitabil...
We introduce uncertainty into the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) model to study optimal long-term cont...
We study a novel dynamic principal-agent setting with moral hazard and adverse selection (persistent...
We study a novel dynamic principal-agent setting with moral hazard and adverse selection (persistent...
I study a continuous time principal-agent model in which an unknown parameter and the agent's hidden...
This dissertation contains three related essays which examine contracting environments with moral ha...
It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentivecompatible mechanisms on the assum...
It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentivecompatible mechanisms on the assum...
It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentivecompatible mechanisms on the assum...
It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assu...
It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentivecompatible mechanisms on the assum...