DOIAbstract
The following is a plausible principle of rationality: PROBABILISM A rational agent’s credences should always be probabi-listically coherent. To say that an agent’s credences are probabilistically coherent is to sa
The following is a plausible principle of rationality: PROBABILISM A rational agent’s credences should always be probabi-listically coherent. To say that an agent’s credences are probabilistically coherent is to sa
Approximate coherentism suggests that imperfectly rational agents should hold approximately coherent...
That one's degrees of belief at any one time obey the axioms of probability theory is widely regarde...
This dissertation concerns the interpretation and structure of two intuitive notions: rational crede...
We argue that indeterminate probabilities are not only rationally permissible for a Bayesian agent, ...
Bayesians have a seemingly attractive account of rational credal states in terms of coherence. An ag...
Rational credence should be coherent in the sense that your attitudes should not leave you open to a...
Epistemic probabilities in argumentation frameworks are meant to represent subjective degrees of bel...
Probabilism says an agent is rational only if her credences are probabilistic. This paper is concern...
We assume our agent has a credence function b(·), which is probabilistic. Probabilism for b(·) can i...
Moss (2018) argues that rational agents are best thought of not as having degrees of belief in vario...
According to Aristotle, humans are the rational animal. The borderline between rationality and irrat...
The pragmatic character of the Dutch book argument makes it unsuitable as an "epi-stemic "...
Many accounts of structural rationality give a special role to logic. This paper reviews the problem...
1) Opinion comes in degrees—call them degrees of belief, or credences. 2) The degrees of belief of a...
According to Aristotle, humans are the rational animal. The borderline between rationality and irrat...
Approximate coherentism suggests that imperfectly rational agents should hold approximately coherent...
That one's degrees of belief at any one time obey the axioms of probability theory is widely regarde...
This dissertation concerns the interpretation and structure of two intuitive notions: rational crede...
We argue that indeterminate probabilities are not only rationally permissible for a Bayesian agent, ...
Bayesians have a seemingly attractive account of rational credal states in terms of coherence. An ag...
Rational credence should be coherent in the sense that your attitudes should not leave you open to a...
Epistemic probabilities in argumentation frameworks are meant to represent subjective degrees of bel...
Probabilism says an agent is rational only if her credences are probabilistic. This paper is concern...
We assume our agent has a credence function b(·), which is probabilistic. Probabilism for b(·) can i...
Moss (2018) argues that rational agents are best thought of not as having degrees of belief in vario...
According to Aristotle, humans are the rational animal. The borderline between rationality and irrat...
The pragmatic character of the Dutch book argument makes it unsuitable as an "epi-stemic "...
Many accounts of structural rationality give a special role to logic. This paper reviews the problem...
1) Opinion comes in degrees—call them degrees of belief, or credences. 2) The degrees of belief of a...
According to Aristotle, humans are the rational animal. The borderline between rationality and irrat...
Approximate coherentism suggests that imperfectly rational agents should hold approximately coherent...
That one's degrees of belief at any one time obey the axioms of probability theory is widely regarde...
This dissertation concerns the interpretation and structure of two intuitive notions: rational crede...
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