Tournaments and Piece Rates Revisited: A Theoretical and Experimental Study of Premium Incentives

Tournaments represent an increasingly important component of organizational compensation systems. While prior research focused on fixed-prize tournaments, i.e., on tournaments where the prize or prize sum to be awarded is set in advance, we introduce a new type of tournament into the literature: premium incentives. While premium incentives, just like fixed-prize tournaments, are based on relative perfor-mance, the prize to be awarded is not set in advance but is a function of the firm’s success: the prize is high if the firm is successful and low if it is not successful. Re-lying on a simple model of cost minimization, we are able to show that premium incentives outperform fixed-prize tournaments as well as piece rates. Our theoreti-cal result is qualitatively confirmed by a controlled laboratory experiment and has important practical implications for the design of organizational incentive systems