The gures over the next few pages show the results from all runs of the simulations as described in the main text. 1 Figure A.1: Repentant and forgiving strategies decrease one-shot cooperation when one-shot games are very rare (P = 0:1) and agents have 10 partners. These show the expected probability of one-shot cooperation averaged over the last 500 generations of the 10,000 generation simulation for all values of d, b, and w. These are the same parameter combinations reported by Delton et al. (2011). Treatment 1, where agents, as in DKCT play only TFT or ALLD has the highest probability of one-shot cooperation. Treatment 2, where ALLD is replaced by a repentant strategy, DIMAS, has less one-shot cooperation. In Treatment 3, where a savvy...
A and B: The time evolution of different strategies resulted from the replicator-mutator dynamics A ...
<p>The graphs show two typical simulation runs for a population of size 100. At the beginning of eac...
<p>Each graph depicts the average payoff for various , measured in fractions of the initial endowmen...
The density of cooperators, ρC, A, the density of soft strategies in game B, ρd, B, the normalized p...
The density of cooperators, ρC, A, the density of soft strategies in game B, ρd, B, the normalized p...
Cooperation based on mutual investments can occur between unrelated individuals when they are engage...
<p>(A) Mean time courses of the actual probability of cooperation, . The lines represent the actual ...
This is the final version. Available on open access from Nature Research via the DOI in this recordD...
Abstract: We provide perhaps the first clean evidence on how cooperation rates vary across payoff pa...
2 Three models are presented in which two players agree to share power in a particular ratio, but ei...
<p>The update rules are (A) imitation and (B) death-birth, and each process has for a selection inte...
ROC curves from the signal detection literature are used in an evolutionary analysis of one-shot and...
<p>Panels (a) and (b): Histograms of earnings in simulations of the heterogeneous model, for all pla...
A: The probability of settling in cooperative fixed point starting from random initial conditions fo...
I discuss recent work that characterizes what outcomes correspond to evolutionarily stable strategie...
A and B: The time evolution of different strategies resulted from the replicator-mutator dynamics A ...
<p>The graphs show two typical simulation runs for a population of size 100. At the beginning of eac...
<p>Each graph depicts the average payoff for various , measured in fractions of the initial endowmen...
The density of cooperators, ρC, A, the density of soft strategies in game B, ρd, B, the normalized p...
The density of cooperators, ρC, A, the density of soft strategies in game B, ρd, B, the normalized p...
Cooperation based on mutual investments can occur between unrelated individuals when they are engage...
<p>(A) Mean time courses of the actual probability of cooperation, . The lines represent the actual ...
This is the final version. Available on open access from Nature Research via the DOI in this recordD...
Abstract: We provide perhaps the first clean evidence on how cooperation rates vary across payoff pa...
2 Three models are presented in which two players agree to share power in a particular ratio, but ei...
<p>The update rules are (A) imitation and (B) death-birth, and each process has for a selection inte...
ROC curves from the signal detection literature are used in an evolutionary analysis of one-shot and...
<p>Panels (a) and (b): Histograms of earnings in simulations of the heterogeneous model, for all pla...
A: The probability of settling in cooperative fixed point starting from random initial conditions fo...
I discuss recent work that characterizes what outcomes correspond to evolutionarily stable strategie...
A and B: The time evolution of different strategies resulted from the replicator-mutator dynamics A ...
<p>The graphs show two typical simulation runs for a population of size 100. At the beginning of eac...
<p>Each graph depicts the average payoff for various , measured in fractions of the initial endowmen...