Social networks are increasingly being used to conduct polls. We introduce a simple model of such social polling. We suppose agents vote sequentially, but the order in which agents choose to vote is not necessarily fixed. We also suppose that an agent’s vote is influenced by the votes of their friends who have already voted. Despite its sim-plicity, this model provides useful insights into a number of areas including social polling, sequential voting, and manipulation. We prove that the number of candidates and the network structure affect the computational com-plexity of computing which candidate necessarily or pos-sibly can win in such a social poll. For social networks with bounded treewidth and a bounded number of candi-dates, we provid...
Usually a voting rule or correspondence requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. ...
In sequential majority voting, preferences are aggregated by a sequence of pairwise comparisons (als...
Many hardness results in computational social choice make use of the fact that every directed graph ...
Social networks are increasingly being used to conduct polls. We introduce a simple model of such so...
In the POSSIBLE WINNER problem in computational social choice theory, we are given a set of partial ...
We study the computational complexity of the counting version of the Possible-Winner problem for ele...
One view of voting is that voters have inherently differ-ent preferences – de gustibus non est dispu...
Many real systems are made of strongly interacting networks, with profound consequences on their dyn...
Series Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, Volume 285In a voting system, voters m...
In utilitarian social choice settings, agents have cardinal utilities over candidates, while for man...
We investigate the effects that social influence can have on the behaviour of agents in a social net...
Classic social choice theory assumes that votes are independent (but possibly conditioned on an un-d...
We investigate the effects of the social influence in determining the behavior of agents in a social...
We introduce a new threshold model of social networks, in which the nodes influenced by their neighb...
We study communication in social networks prior to a majority vote on two alternative policies. Som...
Usually a voting rule or correspondence requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. ...
In sequential majority voting, preferences are aggregated by a sequence of pairwise comparisons (als...
Many hardness results in computational social choice make use of the fact that every directed graph ...
Social networks are increasingly being used to conduct polls. We introduce a simple model of such so...
In the POSSIBLE WINNER problem in computational social choice theory, we are given a set of partial ...
We study the computational complexity of the counting version of the Possible-Winner problem for ele...
One view of voting is that voters have inherently differ-ent preferences – de gustibus non est dispu...
Many real systems are made of strongly interacting networks, with profound consequences on their dyn...
Series Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, Volume 285In a voting system, voters m...
In utilitarian social choice settings, agents have cardinal utilities over candidates, while for man...
We investigate the effects that social influence can have on the behaviour of agents in a social net...
Classic social choice theory assumes that votes are independent (but possibly conditioned on an un-d...
We investigate the effects of the social influence in determining the behavior of agents in a social...
We introduce a new threshold model of social networks, in which the nodes influenced by their neighb...
We study communication in social networks prior to a majority vote on two alternative policies. Som...
Usually a voting rule or correspondence requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. ...
In sequential majority voting, preferences are aggregated by a sequence of pairwise comparisons (als...
Many hardness results in computational social choice make use of the fact that every directed graph ...