PEV-based Reactive Power Compensation for Wind DG Units: A Stackelberg Game Approach

Abstract—There has been a growing interest recently towards integrating more renewable energy resources, in particular wind power, in form of distributed generation (DG) units. However, one important challenge with wind DG units is to provide low-cost and fast-responding reactive power compensation of the wind turbine’s inductive load to ensure a stable voltage profile in the system. Since reactive power can only be compensated locally, we consider a scenario where a wind DG unit is co-located with a plug-in electric vehicle (PEV) charging station or a parking lot, and we investigate how to align incentives to encourage PEV owners to participate in reactive power compensation for wind DG units. For this purpose, in this paper, we introduce a two-stage Stackelberg game between the wind DG unit and the PEV owners. We use backward induction to analyze the formulated game and derive the optimal pricing scheme. We assess the performance of our proposed scheme using field data and make suggestions for the size of the charging stations. Keywords—Distributed generation, wind power integration, plug-in electric vehicles, reactive power compensation, real time pricing, Stackelberg game, subgame perfect equilibrium. I