Parties, Electoral Systems and Taxation 1870-1945 Per Andersson∗

Work in progress. Please do not cite without permission. In this paper I argue that the effect of ideology on tax structure depends on the electoral system. Earlier research has argued that left wing governments tax more pro-gressively, but in light of recent empirical work, this has been challenged. The dominant approach instead posits that the left taxes regressively while spending progressively. That is, the left still redistributes more, but it taxes regressively. I show that in the time period leading up to the Second World War, the impact of having a left wing head of government is different depending on the electoral system. In majoritarian systems, left government leads to a more progressive tax system with a heavier emphasis on in-come tax and less on excise and consumption. In proportional representation systems, the left taxes consumption heavier and income lighter. I argue that this is the result of representation and post-electoral bargaining shaping the strategic context in which the left operates