doi: 10.1209/0295-5075/77/30004 Cooperation enhanced by inhomogeneous activity of teaching for evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma games

PACS 02.50.Le – Decision theory and game theory PACS 07.05.Tp – Computer modeling and simulation PACS 87.23.-n – Ecology and evolution Abstract – Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma games with quenched inhomogeneities in the spatial dynamical rules are considered. The players following one of the two pure strategies (cooperation or defection) are distributed on a two-dimensional lattice. The rate of strategy adoption from randomly chosen neighbors is controlled by the payoff difference and a two-value pre-factor w characterizing the players whom the strategy learned from. The reduced teaching activity of players is distributed randomly with concentrations ν at the beginning and fixed further on. Numerical and analytical calculations are performed to study the concentration of cooperators as a function of w and ν for different noise levels and connectivity structures. Significant increase of cooperation is found within a wide range of parameters for this dynamics. The results highlight the importance of asymmetry characterizing the exchange of master-follower role during the strategy adoptions. Copyright c © EPLA, 2007 Different versions of evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemm