An Analytical Framework for Measuring Network Security using Exploit Dependency Graph

Abstract—Attack graph is a popular tool for modeling multi-staged, correlated attacks on computer networks. At-tack graphs have been widely used for measuring network security risks. A major portion of these works, have used host based or state based attack graphs. These attack graph models are either too restrictive or too resource consuming. Also, a significant portion of these works have used ‘probability of successfully exploiting a network ’ as the metric. This approach requires that the ‘probability of successfully exploiting individual vulnerabilities ’ be known a priori. Finding such probabilities is inherently difficult. This work uses exploit dependency graph, which is a space efficient and expressive attack graph model. It also associates an additive cost with executing individual exploits, and defines a security metric in terms of the ‘min-imum cost required to successfully exploit the network’. The problem of calculating the said metric is proved to be NP-Complete. A modified depth first branch and bound algorithm has been described for calculating it. This work also formulates, a linear time computable, security metric in terms of the ‘expected cost required to successfully exploit the network ’ assuming a random attacker model and an uncorrelated attack graph