MONTE CARLO SAMPLING AND REGRET MINIMIZATION FOR EQUILIBRIUM COMPUTATION AND DECISION-MAKING IN LARGE EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES

Permission is hereby granted to the University of Alberta Libraries to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly or scientific research purposes only. Where the thesis is converted to, or otherwise made available in digital form, the University of Alberta will advise potential users of the thesis of these terms. The author reserves all other publication and other rights in association with the copyright in the thesis, and except as herein before provided, neither the thesis nor any substantial portion thereof may be printed or otherwise reproduced in any material form whatever without the author’s prior written permission. In this thesis, we investigate the problem of decision-making in large two-player zero-sum games using Monte Carlo sampling and regret minimization methods. We demonstrate four major contributions. The first is Monte Carlo Counterfactual Regret Minimization (MC-CFR): a generic family of sample-based algorithms that compute near-optimal equilibrium strategies. Secondly, we develop a theory for applying counterfactual regret minimization to a generic subset of imperfect recall games as well as a lossy abstraction mechanism fo