We study the effect of ownership and governance on what is arguably a firm’s most valuable asset: its reputation. We model a “brand-capital”, a firm whose sole asset is its reputation with consumers. We show that, for such firms, professional non-owner-management can protect brand capital provided management compensation and retention policy are set by outsiders. Moreover, if compensation policy is transparent, professional management can sometimes protect brand capital better than owner-management. Separating ownership and management separates owners from incentives to opportunistically harvest reputation capital and provides them with incentives to counter managerial opportunism
In this paper we analyze the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in motivating managers...
It is widely accepted that only the protection of private property rights and competition by rival f...
Corporate governance encompasses a broad spectrum of mechanisms intended to mitigate agency risk by ...
Reputation is a valuable asset to firms, yet the impact of corporate governance of reputation-relian...
In order to be incentivized to produce high quality products, the firm’s key decision maker must suf...
Managerial Ownership, Capital Structure and Firm Value This paper extends prior research to examine ...
Firm ownership is an increasingly influential form of corporate governance. Although firms might be ...
The thesis of this paper is that human capital is inalienable: it cannot be bought or sold. Control ...
We analyze simultaneously the determinants of governance, debt, and activist institutional ownership...
For ages, the view that corporate reputation positively impacts on firm performance has been documen...
In this dissertation a simple model is used to show that the benefits of managerial control are far ...
This paper extends prior research to examine the managerial ownership influences on firm performance...
In a global economy increasingly focused on knowledge and services, the long-term strategic advantag...
We show that the allocation of managerial ownership to individuals within firms varies depending upo...
Is the reputation of a firm tradable when the change in ownership is observ-able? We consider a comp...
In this paper we analyze the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in motivating managers...
It is widely accepted that only the protection of private property rights and competition by rival f...
Corporate governance encompasses a broad spectrum of mechanisms intended to mitigate agency risk by ...
Reputation is a valuable asset to firms, yet the impact of corporate governance of reputation-relian...
In order to be incentivized to produce high quality products, the firm’s key decision maker must suf...
Managerial Ownership, Capital Structure and Firm Value This paper extends prior research to examine ...
Firm ownership is an increasingly influential form of corporate governance. Although firms might be ...
The thesis of this paper is that human capital is inalienable: it cannot be bought or sold. Control ...
We analyze simultaneously the determinants of governance, debt, and activist institutional ownership...
For ages, the view that corporate reputation positively impacts on firm performance has been documen...
In this dissertation a simple model is used to show that the benefits of managerial control are far ...
This paper extends prior research to examine the managerial ownership influences on firm performance...
In a global economy increasingly focused on knowledge and services, the long-term strategic advantag...
We show that the allocation of managerial ownership to individuals within firms varies depending upo...
Is the reputation of a firm tradable when the change in ownership is observ-able? We consider a comp...
In this paper we analyze the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in motivating managers...
It is widely accepted that only the protection of private property rights and competition by rival f...
Corporate governance encompasses a broad spectrum of mechanisms intended to mitigate agency risk by ...