Unconditionally secure computers, algorithms and hardware, such as memories, processors, keyboards, flash and hard drives, Fluct

In the case of the need of extraordinary security, Kirchhoff-loop-Johnson-(like)-noise ciphers can easily be integrated on existing types of digital chips in order to provide secure data communication between hardware processors, memory chips, hard disks and other units within a computer or other data processor system. The secure key exchange can take place at the very first run and the system can renew the key later at random times with an authenticated fashion to prohibit man-in-the-middle attack. The key can be stored in flash memories within the communicating chip units at hidden random addresses among other random bits that are continuously generated by the secure line but are never actually used. Thus, even if the system is disassembled, and the eavesdropper can have direct access to the communication lines between the units, or even if she is trying to use a man-in-the-middle attack, no information can be extracted. The only way to break the code is to learn the chip structure, to understand the machine code program and to read out the information during running by accessing the proper internal ports of the working chips. However such an attack needs extraordinary resources and even that can be prohibited by a password lockout. The unconditional security of commercial algorithms against piracy can be provided in a similar way. When a computer is lost, even if it is password protected, after disassembling it, th