In this paper we examine the emergence of Nash efficient solutions for a Continuous Double Auction (CDA) market, since it is the dominant institution for the real-world trading of equities, energy, derivatives, etc. and there is a lot of valuable knowledge from Experimental Economics. We endow the soft-agents with Zero-Intelligence (ZI), Zero-Intelligence Plus (ZIP), Kaplan (K) and Gjerstad-Dickhaut (GD) ask-bidding strategies. Every class of agents in previous works has a fixed strategy. But we allow our soft-agents to change their strategies in an autonomous and evolutionary process. Instead of the modeler fixing the agents strategies and then calibrating the parameters to achieve Nash equilibrium we look for autonomous emergence of Nash ...
(POLHIA)”, grant no.225408. Valentyn Panchenko acknowledges the support under Australian Research Co...
In this paper we explore how specific aspects of market transparency and agents' behavior affect the...
We examine auction design in a context where symmetrically informed agents with com-mon valuations l...
AbstractIn this paper, we describe a novel bidding strategy that autonomous trading agents can use t...
auctions, agents, traders, zip, genetic algorithms The continuous double-auction (CDA) is a powerful...
We present a novel method for automatically acquiring strategies for the double auction by combining...
In this paper, we investigate the effectiveness of different types of bidding behaviour for trading ...
The Continuous Double Auction (CDA) is the dominant market institution for real-world trading of e...
Empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA) combines tools from simulation, search, statistics, and gam...
We develop a novel bidding strategy that software agents can use to buy and sell goods in Continuous...
In developing open, heterogeneous and distributed multi-agent systems researchers often face a probl...
In this paper we explore how specific aspects of market transparency and agents’ behavior affect the...
The last decade has seen a shift in emphasis from centralised to decentralised systems to meet the d...
The last decade has seen a shift in emphasis from centralised to decentralised systems to meet the d...
The continuous double auction (CDA) has found itself in a state of ubiquity in today's market landsc...
(POLHIA)”, grant no.225408. Valentyn Panchenko acknowledges the support under Australian Research Co...
In this paper we explore how specific aspects of market transparency and agents' behavior affect the...
We examine auction design in a context where symmetrically informed agents with com-mon valuations l...
AbstractIn this paper, we describe a novel bidding strategy that autonomous trading agents can use t...
auctions, agents, traders, zip, genetic algorithms The continuous double-auction (CDA) is a powerful...
We present a novel method for automatically acquiring strategies for the double auction by combining...
In this paper, we investigate the effectiveness of different types of bidding behaviour for trading ...
The Continuous Double Auction (CDA) is the dominant market institution for real-world trading of e...
Empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA) combines tools from simulation, search, statistics, and gam...
We develop a novel bidding strategy that software agents can use to buy and sell goods in Continuous...
In developing open, heterogeneous and distributed multi-agent systems researchers often face a probl...
In this paper we explore how specific aspects of market transparency and agents’ behavior affect the...
The last decade has seen a shift in emphasis from centralised to decentralised systems to meet the d...
The last decade has seen a shift in emphasis from centralised to decentralised systems to meet the d...
The continuous double auction (CDA) has found itself in a state of ubiquity in today's market landsc...
(POLHIA)”, grant no.225408. Valentyn Panchenko acknowledges the support under Australian Research Co...
In this paper we explore how specific aspects of market transparency and agents' behavior affect the...
We examine auction design in a context where symmetrically informed agents with com-mon valuations l...