We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a dark side,that is, result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. In line with theoretical predictions, information on the popularity of policy choices is bene cial when a minority of voters is biased, but harmful when a majority is biased. In theory, information on the success of policy choices elsewhere de-biases voters and alleviates the ine ¢ ciency. However, in the experiment, providing social information on success is ine¤ective and does not de-bias voters
We present a theory of voting that predicts that elections are more likely to be close, and voter tu...
This paper investigates how information affects voting behavior. Specifically, I test (i) if more in...
In elections, majority divisions pave the way to focal manipulations and coordination failures, whic...
We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are b...
We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are b...
We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are b...
We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when voters are biased...
We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some vot-ers are ...
This paper both theoretically and experimentally studies the properties of plurality and approval vo...
This paper both theoretically and experimentally studies the properties of plurality and approval vo...
This paper analyzes participation and information aggregation in a common-value election with contin...
This article analyzes participation and information aggregation in a common-value election with cont...
I analyze symmetric majority rule voting equilibria when voters wish to elect the better candidate a...
We propose a theory-based experimental approach to compare the properties of approval voting (AV) wi...
Although majority rule has limited value for aggregating conflicting preferences, it offers promise ...
We present a theory of voting that predicts that elections are more likely to be close, and voter tu...
This paper investigates how information affects voting behavior. Specifically, I test (i) if more in...
In elections, majority divisions pave the way to focal manipulations and coordination failures, whic...
We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are b...
We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are b...
We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are b...
We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when voters are biased...
We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some vot-ers are ...
This paper both theoretically and experimentally studies the properties of plurality and approval vo...
This paper both theoretically and experimentally studies the properties of plurality and approval vo...
This paper analyzes participation and information aggregation in a common-value election with contin...
This article analyzes participation and information aggregation in a common-value election with cont...
I analyze symmetric majority rule voting equilibria when voters wish to elect the better candidate a...
We propose a theory-based experimental approach to compare the properties of approval voting (AV) wi...
Although majority rule has limited value for aggregating conflicting preferences, it offers promise ...
We present a theory of voting that predicts that elections are more likely to be close, and voter tu...
This paper investigates how information affects voting behavior. Specifically, I test (i) if more in...
In elections, majority divisions pave the way to focal manipulations and coordination failures, whic...