Add to ORKGIn ‘The nature of moral judgments and the extent of the moral domain, ’ Fraser (2012) criticizes findings by Kelly et al. (2007) that speak against the moral/conventional distinction, arguing that the experiment was confounded. First, we note that the results of that experiment held up when confounds were removed (Quintelier, Fessler, and De Smet 2012). Second, and more importantly, we argue that attempts to prove the existence of a moral/conventional distinction are systematically confounded. In contrast to Fraser, we refer to data that support our view. We highlight the implications for the moral/conventional theory
Human moral judgement may have evolved to maximize the individual\u27s welfare given parochial cultu...
In this article I ask what recent moral psychology and neuroscience can and can’t claim to have disc...
In this article I ask what recent moral psychology and neuroscience can and can’t claim to have disc...
In ‘The nature of moral judgments and the extent of the moral domain’, Fraser (2012) criticises find...
Commonsense suggests that moral judgements and conventional normative judge-ments are importantly di...
In an experimental critique of the moral/conventional (M/C) distinction, Kelly et al. (2007) present...
Certain researchers in the field of moral psychology, following Turiel (1983), argue that children a...
This paper considers John Doris, Stephen Stich, Alexandra Plakias, and colleagues’ recent attempts t...
<div><p>Over the past decade, intuitionist models of morality have challenged the view that moral re...
Our paper [1] compared two competing hypotheses. The hypothesis that we label universalistic moral e...
Over the past decade, intuitionist models of morality have challenged the view that moral reasoning ...
Over the past decade, intuitionist models of morality have challenged the view that moral reasoning ...
Evidence that individuals distinguish between moral and conventional rules is reviewed. Moral rules...
Philip Gorski’s effort to bridge the gap between social science and morality is well intended, but m...
We argue that there is significant evidence for reconsidering the possibility that moral judgment co...
Human moral judgement may have evolved to maximize the individual\u27s welfare given parochial cultu...
In this article I ask what recent moral psychology and neuroscience can and can’t claim to have disc...
In this article I ask what recent moral psychology and neuroscience can and can’t claim to have disc...
In ‘The nature of moral judgments and the extent of the moral domain’, Fraser (2012) criticises find...
Commonsense suggests that moral judgements and conventional normative judge-ments are importantly di...
In an experimental critique of the moral/conventional (M/C) distinction, Kelly et al. (2007) present...
Certain researchers in the field of moral psychology, following Turiel (1983), argue that children a...
This paper considers John Doris, Stephen Stich, Alexandra Plakias, and colleagues’ recent attempts t...
<div><p>Over the past decade, intuitionist models of morality have challenged the view that moral re...
Our paper [1] compared two competing hypotheses. The hypothesis that we label universalistic moral e...
Over the past decade, intuitionist models of morality have challenged the view that moral reasoning ...
Over the past decade, intuitionist models of morality have challenged the view that moral reasoning ...
Evidence that individuals distinguish between moral and conventional rules is reviewed. Moral rules...
Philip Gorski’s effort to bridge the gap between social science and morality is well intended, but m...
We argue that there is significant evidence for reconsidering the possibility that moral judgment co...
Human moral judgement may have evolved to maximize the individual\u27s welfare given parochial cultu...
In this article I ask what recent moral psychology and neuroscience can and can’t claim to have disc...
In this article I ask what recent moral psychology and neuroscience can and can’t claim to have disc...