Add to ORKGThe actions of a rational agent reveal information about its mental states. These inferred mental states, particularly the agent’s intentions, play an important role in the evaluation of moral permissibility. While previous computational models have shown that beliefs and desires can be inferred from be-havior under the assumption of rational action they have crit-ically lacked a third mental state, intentions. In this work, we develop a novel formalism for intentions and show how they can be inferred as counterfactual contrasts over influence dia-grams. This model is used to quantitatively explain judgments about intention and moral permissibility in classic and novel trolley problems
According to Haidt's (2001) social intuitionist model (SIM), an individual's moral judgment normally...
In this paper an empirical theory about the nature of intention is sketched. After stressing the nec...
This experiment investigates the existence of correspondences between modal and moral belief judgmen...
The actions of a rational agent reveal information about its mental states. These inferred mental st...
Moral judgement requires representing what is possible: judging that someone ought to do something i...
Given the important role that intentions play in the way we make decisions, we would expect intentio...
The Emotional Perception Model of moral judgment intends to account for experientialism about morali...
When holding others morally responsible, we care about what they did, and what they thought. Traditi...
Rational choice models are characterized by the image of the self-interested Homo economicus. The ro...
Intentions, an integral part of the mental state of an agent, play an important role in determining ...
A current aim in research on moral cognition is the development of computational models of moral cho...
This paper presents two methods for interpreting human actions or their results with the aim of find...
Research on ‘moral dilemmas’ has shown that respondents judge personal moral actions (“to push” in t...
Recent Social Intuitionist work suggests that moral judgments are intuitive (not based on conscious ...
Reasoning about intentional action is a pervasive and critical skill in the human cognitive repertoi...
According to Haidt's (2001) social intuitionist model (SIM), an individual's moral judgment normally...
In this paper an empirical theory about the nature of intention is sketched. After stressing the nec...
This experiment investigates the existence of correspondences between modal and moral belief judgmen...
The actions of a rational agent reveal information about its mental states. These inferred mental st...
Moral judgement requires representing what is possible: judging that someone ought to do something i...
Given the important role that intentions play in the way we make decisions, we would expect intentio...
The Emotional Perception Model of moral judgment intends to account for experientialism about morali...
When holding others morally responsible, we care about what they did, and what they thought. Traditi...
Rational choice models are characterized by the image of the self-interested Homo economicus. The ro...
Intentions, an integral part of the mental state of an agent, play an important role in determining ...
A current aim in research on moral cognition is the development of computational models of moral cho...
This paper presents two methods for interpreting human actions or their results with the aim of find...
Research on ‘moral dilemmas’ has shown that respondents judge personal moral actions (“to push” in t...
Recent Social Intuitionist work suggests that moral judgments are intuitive (not based on conscious ...
Reasoning about intentional action is a pervasive and critical skill in the human cognitive repertoi...
According to Haidt's (2001) social intuitionist model (SIM), an individual's moral judgment normally...
In this paper an empirical theory about the nature of intention is sketched. After stressing the nec...
This experiment investigates the existence of correspondences between modal and moral belief judgmen...