The Attack of the Clones: A Study of the Impact of Shared Code on Vulnerability Patching

Abstract—Vulnerability exploits remain an important mecha-nism for malware delivery, despite efforts to speed up the creation of patches and improvements in software updating mechanisms. Vulnerabilities in client applications (e.g., browsers, multimedia players, document readers and editors) are often exploited in spear phishing attacks and are difficult to characterize using network vulnerability scanners. Analyzing their lifecycle requires observing the deployment of patches on hosts around the world. Using data collected over 5 years on 8.4 million hosts, available through Symantec’s WINE platform, we present the first system-atic study of patch deployment in client-side vulnerabilities. We analyze the patch deployment process of 1,593 vulner-abilities from 10 popular client applications, and we identify several new threats presented by multiple installations of the same program and by shared libraries distributed with several applications. For the 80 vulnerabilities in our dataset that affect code shared by two applications, the time between patch releases in the different applications is up to 118 days (with a median of 11 days). Furthermore, as the patching rates differ considerably among applications, many hosts patch the vulnerability in one application but not in the other one. We demonstrate two novel attacks that enable exploitation by invoking old versions of applications that are used infrequently, but remain installed. We also find that the median fraction of vulnerable hosts patched when exploits are released is at most 14%. Finally, we show that the patching rate is affected by user-specific and application-specific factors; for example, hosts belonging to security analysts and applications with an automated updating mechanism have significantly lower median times to patch. I