Add to ORKGThis paper investigates \u85rmsabilities to tacitly collude when they each monopolize a proprietary aftermarket. When \u85rmsaftermarkets are completely isolated from foremarket competition, they cannot tacitly collude more easily than single-product \u85rms. However, when their aftermarket power is contested by foremarket competition as equipment owners view new equipment as a substitute for their incumbent \u85rms aftermarket product, pro\u85table tacit collusion is sustainable among a larger number of \u85rms. Conditions under which introduction of aftermarket competition hinders rmsability to tacitly collude are characterized
This paper considers the possibility of technology licensing and tacit collusion between firms that ...
We characterize the interplay between firms\u27 decision in terms of product standardization and the...
This paper analyses the incentives for collusion when an industry is regulated by means of yardstick...
This paper investigates \u85rmsabilities to tacitly collude when they each monopolize a proprietary ...
This paper investigates firms' abilities to tacitly collude when they each monopolize a proprietary ...
This paper investigates firms' abilities to tacitly collude when they each monopolize a proprietary ...
Abstract This paper investigates firms' abilities to tacitly collude when these firms each mono...
This paper studies competition among equipment sellers who each monopolize their equipment’s afterma...
In many recent antitrust cases, manufacturers of complex high-technology equipment have been accused...
In this paper, I show that the standard Bertrand competition argument does not apply when firms comp...
Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/73365/1/j.1365-2745.1998.00285.x.pd
In this paper, I show that the standard Bertrand competition argument does not apply when firms comp...
This paper analyzes the emergence of collusive equilibria in an oligopoly of pro-ducers facing an ol...
We characterize the interplay between firms' decision in terms of product standardization and the na...
We characterize the interplay between firms' decision in terms of product standardization and the na...
This paper considers the possibility of technology licensing and tacit collusion between firms that ...
We characterize the interplay between firms\u27 decision in terms of product standardization and the...
This paper analyses the incentives for collusion when an industry is regulated by means of yardstick...
This paper investigates \u85rmsabilities to tacitly collude when they each monopolize a proprietary ...
This paper investigates firms' abilities to tacitly collude when they each monopolize a proprietary ...
This paper investigates firms' abilities to tacitly collude when they each monopolize a proprietary ...
Abstract This paper investigates firms' abilities to tacitly collude when these firms each mono...
This paper studies competition among equipment sellers who each monopolize their equipment’s afterma...
In many recent antitrust cases, manufacturers of complex high-technology equipment have been accused...
In this paper, I show that the standard Bertrand competition argument does not apply when firms comp...
Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/73365/1/j.1365-2745.1998.00285.x.pd
In this paper, I show that the standard Bertrand competition argument does not apply when firms comp...
This paper analyzes the emergence of collusive equilibria in an oligopoly of pro-ducers facing an ol...
We characterize the interplay between firms' decision in terms of product standardization and the na...
We characterize the interplay between firms' decision in terms of product standardization and the na...
This paper considers the possibility of technology licensing and tacit collusion between firms that ...
We characterize the interplay between firms\u27 decision in terms of product standardization and the...
This paper analyses the incentives for collusion when an industry is regulated by means of yardstick...