Against advanced modalizing∗

I discuss a problem for modal realism raised by John Divers and oth-ers. I argue that the problem is real enough but that Divers ’ “advanced modalising ” solution is inadquate. The problem can only be solved by 1) holding that modal realism is only contingently true, 2) embracing a kind of Meinongianism about ontological commitment, or 3) abandoning the project of “analysing modality”. 1 The modal status of modal realism Suppose that modal realism is necessarily true. By modal realism, I mean the thesis that there is a plurality of worlds, that those worlds are isolated spacetimes just as real as our own, that the worlds satisfy some principle of recombination, that some worlds have as parts blue swans, talking donkeys, etc. Roughly, modal realism is the content of David Lewis’s book On the plurality of worlds. It is a logical consequence of modal realism that there are blue swans. After all, if there is some world that has a blue swan as a part, then there are blue swans