Summary. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for weak (semi)continuity of the expected utility. Such conditions are also given for the weak compactness of the domain of the expected utility. Our results have useful applications in cooperative solution concepts in economies and games with differential information, in noncooperat ive games with differential information and in principal-agent problems.
A standard model of intertemporal allocation (described by a technology set and a welfare function d...
The Pasadena Game – the topic of this talk – is a variation on the St. Petersburg Game familiar from...
This paper provides a formal generalization of Nash equilibrium for games under Knightian uncertaint...
In this paper, we provide two novel expected utility theorems by suitably adjustingthe independence ...
In this paper, we examine some characterizing implications of the expected utility model with a part...
Subjective expected utility maximization with continuous utility is characterized, extending the res...
A decision maker faces a decision problem, or a game against na-ture. For each probability distribut...
Inoue T. A utility representation theorem with weaker continuity condition. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ...
When sufficiently small perturbations of parameters preserve strict preference for one alternative o...
Utility functions form an essential part of game theory and economics. In order to guarantee the exi...
This paper provides an easy verifiable regularity condition under which the investor’s utility maxim...
Summary. We study upper semi-continuity of the private and coarse core and the Walrasian expectation...
International audienceA decision maker faces a decision problem, or a game against nature. For each ...
We study upper semi-continuity of the private and coarse core and the Walrasian expectations equilib...
We study the problem of obtaining an expected utility representation for a potentially incomplete pr...
A standard model of intertemporal allocation (described by a technology set and a welfare function d...
The Pasadena Game – the topic of this talk – is a variation on the St. Petersburg Game familiar from...
This paper provides a formal generalization of Nash equilibrium for games under Knightian uncertaint...
In this paper, we provide two novel expected utility theorems by suitably adjustingthe independence ...
In this paper, we examine some characterizing implications of the expected utility model with a part...
Subjective expected utility maximization with continuous utility is characterized, extending the res...
A decision maker faces a decision problem, or a game against na-ture. For each probability distribut...
Inoue T. A utility representation theorem with weaker continuity condition. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ...
When sufficiently small perturbations of parameters preserve strict preference for one alternative o...
Utility functions form an essential part of game theory and economics. In order to guarantee the exi...
This paper provides an easy verifiable regularity condition under which the investor’s utility maxim...
Summary. We study upper semi-continuity of the private and coarse core and the Walrasian expectation...
International audienceA decision maker faces a decision problem, or a game against nature. For each ...
We study upper semi-continuity of the private and coarse core and the Walrasian expectations equilib...
We study the problem of obtaining an expected utility representation for a potentially incomplete pr...
A standard model of intertemporal allocation (described by a technology set and a welfare function d...
The Pasadena Game – the topic of this talk – is a variation on the St. Petersburg Game familiar from...
This paper provides a formal generalization of Nash equilibrium for games under Knightian uncertaint...